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TOWARDS A PROGRAM FOR FINANCIAL STABILITY                                               
 
                                                          Abstract 
 
Fifty years ago Milton Friedman published a book entitled A Program for Monetary 
Stability.  In it he outlined a number of suggestions for the conduct of monetary and fiscal 
policies that he thought would contribute to monetary stability and pari passu to price 
stability and a greater degree of output/employment stability.  In this paper I review some 
of his policy prescriptions in light of the financial and economic crisis of 2007-2009.  
From the perspective of financial development the world today is much different from the 
world that Friedman knew in the late 1950’s.  In what way would his policy 
recommendations have to be modified to account for these changes in financial 
development?  To stabilize the banking system we argue that his proposal for 100 percent 
reserves or narrow banking merits serious consideration in current policy discussions.  To 
stabilize asset markets we propose two policies that Friedman would not likely endorse.  
The first is to reinstate selective credit controls in the areas of the securities markets and 
the real estate market.  The second policy designed to dampen excessive variability in the 
stock market is for the Central Bank to carry out some open market operations in an 
index fund of equities. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
 
   Over a half of a century ago Milton Friedman gave a series of lectures at Fordham 
University that were subsequently published under the title of A Program for Monetary 
Stability (1959) with a new preface added in 1992.  In it he outlined a number of 
suggestions for the conduct of monetary and fiscal policies that he thought would 
contribute to monetary stability and pari passu to price stability and a greater degree of 
output/employment stability.   In this paper I review some of his policy prescriptions in 
light of the financial and economic crisis of 2007-2009.  The goals of policy are the same 
today as they were in his day.  The question is would his policy prescriptions in the late 
1950’s have prevented or substantially blunted the financial and economic crisis that 
began to unfold in 2007?   Of course from the perspective of financial development the 
world is very different today compared to when Friedman wrote.  Would the financial 
development that has taken place between then and now render his policy 
recommendations obsolete?  In what ways would his policy recommendations have to be 
modified to account for these changes in financial development?  These are interesting 
questions that deserve further attention alongside the numerous proposals that have 
recently been offered by financial economists to further regulate our financial system.    
     Friedman made a number of suggestions for policy reform in the Program for 
Monetary Stability.  Some of his suggestions were subsequently adopted, but most were 
not.  Interesting examples of the latter, in light of the current crisis, include eliminating 4 
 
discounts and advances as an instrument of monetary policy, requiring banks to hold 
reserves equal to 100 percent of their deposit liabilities
1, and having the Federal Reserve 
(through open market purchases of government securities) follow a k-percent per year 
(or, 1/12 k-percent per month) rule of steadily increasing the money supply.    An equally 
interesting example of the former includes allowing the Federal Reserve to pay interest 
on reserve balances held by the member banks.  This policy change was implemented in 
October 2008 and revised in December 2008.  
 
 
     The three controversial proposals for monetary reform that were not implemented had 
as their objective the reduction of the volatility in the growth rate of the money supply.  
According to Friedman business cycles were caused by uncontrollable outside 
disturbances and very controllable disturbances in the money supply.  For him the modest 
objective of monetary policy, as far as business cycles were concerned, should be to 
reduce the inter-temporal volatility in the money supply which in turn would reduce the 
controllable part of the volatility in  real output and employment.  What has actually 
happened with respect to these three suggestions since Friedman gave these lectures?  In 
terms of the financial crisis of 2007-2009, discounts and advances –which he advocated 
should be eliminated—actually played a key role in the Federal Reserve’s strategy to 
liquefy the financial system.  One element of this strategy was to lower the investment 
quality of the collateral the Federal Reserve would accept from eligible borrowers.  The 
second part of their strategy was to open up discounts and advances to non-bank 
borrowers.  The end result of this strategy to combat the crisis was that the assets of the 
Federal Reserve rose from $870 billion before the financial crisis to $2 trillion as of April 5 
 
3, 2009.
2   As far as the Friedman-Simons proposal for a 100 percent legal reserve 
requirement on bank deposits was concerned, they have in fact fallen.  When Friedman 
gave his lectures the legal required reserve ratio on net demand deposits was 18 percent 
for Central Reserve City banks, 16.5 percent for Reserve City banks, and 11 percent for 
Country banks.  The three categories of banks were subsequently reduced to one (as 
recommended by Friedman) and presently the requirement is 10 percent on demand 
deposits over $44.4 million for all depository institutions.  Furthermore the effective 
reserve ratio is actually smaller due to the fact that banks are allowed to sweep portions 
of their customer demand deposits into investment accounts (for which the required 
reserve ratio is -0- percent ) overnight and on the weekends.  Finally, what about his k-
percent rule designed to stabilize the growth rate of the money supply?  From 1959 when 
the lectures were originally published to 1992 when he appended an additional preface, 
the average percentage growth rate and standard deviation of the growth rate for M1 were 
respectively .063 and .036.   From 1992-2007 the average growth rate and standard 
deviation of the growth rate for M1 were .028 and .051.  On average the Federal Reserve 
reduced the growth rate in M1 but increased its volatility in the later period compared to 
the earlier period.  According to Friedman and the quantity theory of money the 55 
percent reduction in the average growth rate of M1 should be reflected in a 55 percent 
lower average inflation rate.  That in fact turned out to be approximately the case.  The 
average rate of change in the GDP deflator as a measure of price inflation was .044 over 
the period 1959-1992 and fell to .022 for the period 1992-2007 for a reduction of 50 
percent providing modest support for the quantity theory of money.  Moreover the 
standard deviation in the growth rate of the GDP deflator fell from .025 over the period 6 
 
1959-1992 to .006 in the period 1992-2007.  Thus an over 40 percent increase in the 
standard deviation of the growth rate in M1 (i.e., from .036 to .051) was accompanied by 
an over 75 percent reduction in the standard deviation (i.e., from .025 to .006) of the GDP 
inflation rate.  This may not be consistent with the quantity theory.  In any event the 
actual average inflation rate was both lower and on average more stable in the period 
1992-2007 compared to the period 1959-1992.  What about real output as measured by 
real GDP?   Recall that the objective of the k-percent rule was to stabilize monetary 
growth which according to Friedman would reduce that part of the business cycle caused 
by monetary instability.  What actually happened?  The average growth rate in real GDP 
was .035 in the period 1959-1992 and that fell slightly to .031 in the period 1992-2007.  
The variability of real GDP growth also fell between the two periods which is seemingly 
at variance with Friedman’s prediction based on the increased variability in the money 
supply that actually occurred in the later period.  The standard deviation of the real GDP 
growth rate was .023 in the period 1959-1992, and fell to .011 in the period 1992-2007.  
Many financial economists during the latter time period argued that the reduction in the 
volatility of real GDP (a proxy for macroeconomic risk facing companies) ushered in a 
new era of economic stability thereby warranting an increase in financial leverage and 
financial risk.  Unfortunately many financial and non-financial enterprises acted on this 
advice with disastrous consequences in the period 2007-2009.   While neither of 
Friedman’s policy reforms on reserve requirements or the k-percent rule designed to 
stabilize monetary growth were actually implemented, inflation and output growth on 
average behaved as if they were right up to the beginning of the financial crisis.
      But the 
whole story is not told by merely comparing averages for 1959-1992 to 1992-2007.  The 7 
 
average growth rate for M1 for the three year period 2005-2007 was a -.0023 compared 
to .052 for the previous three year period 2002-2004.  According to Friedman the sharp 
contraction in M1 should, with a lag, cause a subsequent decline in real GDP, which in 
fact actually occurred in 2008-2009.   Some economists have asserted that this abrupt 
contraction in the money supply that drove up borrowing costs for home buyers was an 
important factor in causing the end of the housing bubble and triggered the beginning of 
the financial and economic crisis that began in 2007.    
     Had the Friedman-Simons structural reform of the banking system been implemented, 
would it have prevented the 2007-2009 financial and economic crises?   Setting aside the 
sharp contraction in M1 growth in the three year period prior to the crisis—which 
Friedman would argue in itself would cause a recession--there is reason to believe that 
the precipitating financial crisis would have at least been somewhat moderated.  To begin 
with, on the supply side narrow banks with a 100 percent reserve requirement would no 
longer have been involved in the financing of what turned out to be toxic assets.  The real 
question is whether other non-bank financial institutions (the so-called shadow banking 
system) financed with uninsured claims, would have arisen in place of the banks to fund 
on the same scale the risky real assets being acquired by households and firms in the run-
up to 2007?  It would seem that the answer to this question would be: No.  Without a 
risk-free government insurance program behind the claims financing these non-bank 
financial institutions, risk averse savers would require a higher expected return relative to 
what they would require on insured deposits in present day banks.  This higher required 
rate of return of savers would translate to a higher cost of capital and thereby dampen 
some of the demand for debt financed risky real assets by firms and households in the 8 
 
run-up to 2007.  How much savers required rate of return would have increased and how 
much this increase would decrease the demand for risky real investments by households 
and firms are empirical questions which have not been answered at this point.  In any 
event the end result would have been more moderate economic growth in the run-up 
period accompanied by less speculative debt financing both of which would have 
moderated the crisis beginning in 2007.       
         The current fractional reserve banking system with deposit insurance, where banks 
are also risk-taking financial intermediaries, has resulted in a cost of capital reduction 
subsidy to households and risky firms and a larger stock of risky capital.  It would seem 
that this set of financial arrangements would contribute to a more volatile rate of 
economic growth that would depend in part on how aggressive banks are in their 
portfolio decisions.  Banks in this set of financial arrangements amplify cyclical 
expansions when they ease lending standards but also amplify cyclical recessions when 
they tighten lending standards in a flight to safety.
3  The policy question is whether the 
upside amplification of the real economy is worth the downside amplification.  Net 
present value calculations of “highs” minus “lows” would seem to be a way to address 
this policy issue but this kind of calculation typically depends on the economic position 
of different agents and their discount rates during the highs and lows of the economy.  
     Friedman’s Program was primarily designed to stabilize the growth in the stock of 
money in the hope of achieving a greater degree of macroeconomic stability.  His view 
was to let the private sector in the form of non-bank financial intermediaries and financial 
markets steer the savings of society into productive investment.  Let the private sector 
make the risky investments and reap the profits or suffer the losses without any 9 
 
government regulation or intervention.
  With the exception of his proposal for narrow 
banking this also was the overriding view of the Federal Reserve for at least the past 25 
years.  The objective of policy was to free-up the financial system from depression era 
regulation and allow the financial engineering that had been occurring since the 1980’s to 
create a new financial architecture that would reduce risk per unit of return through such 
products as portfolio insurance, credit default swaps and other contingent claims, and 
various types of securitization schemes.   Both Friedman and the Federal Reserve would 
think it inconceivable that private agents guided by self interest would develop and 
manage financial instruments and architectures in a way that would destroy their own 
wealth and bring down that architecture.  One popular view of the financial crisis is that 
this is what actually happened starting in 2007.  But was it only ignorance of the complex 
contingent claims that were created, blind greed, and flawed compensation schemes that 
brought down the banking system in 2007-2009 as so often is said?  A case could be 
made that banks were merely implementing the portfolio strategies that bank 
stockholders were asking for.  In the 5 year run-up to 2007 the S&P bank stock index was 
on average rising at the rate of 7 percent per year spurred on by a fall in investor risk 
aversion and perceptions of risk.
4  The market signal was for banks to take on riskier 
investments as their cost of capital fell, and this is what they did.  This is not to say that 
their compensation schemes were not flawed and contributed to their investment in risky 
assets, or, that complex opaque securities that were not well understood were created out 
of that architecture.   It is merely to say that optimal investment decisions in the face of a 
falling cost of capital could also account for banks taking on ever riskier investments in 
the run-up period. Therein lies the dilemma for banks.  Checkable deposits are an 10 
 
important component of the money supply that facilitates economic exchange.    In this 
capacity banks from the perspective of society can’t risk failure for fear of causing a 
collapse in economic exchange and the social unrest that comes with the resulting 
recession.   For that reason governments insure bank deposit liabilities.  Presently banks 
are also profit maximizing financial intermediaries.
5   In this capacity it is legitimate for 
them to make risky investments and thereby risk bankruptcy as they solve the “lemons” 
problem of asymmetric information between investing firms and ultimate savers.  To the 
extent they perform this intermediary function efficiently, they facilitate long-run 
economic growth according to conventional theory.  These two functions of safeguarding 
deposit money and successful but risky intermediation are basically incompatible. The 
Friedman-Simons proposal for 100 percent reserves is one solution to this problem in a 
step towards financial stability. The goal for the rest of this paper is to move beyond 
Friedman’s proposals for monetary stability to consider a Program for Financial 
Stability. 
 
II.   TOWARDS A PROGRAM  FOR  FINANCIAL STABILITY  
 The Case for Narrow Banking 
     Any reform of the financial system must begin with the banking system.  For the most 
part regulation has focused attention on both the asset side and the liability and equity 
side of the balance sheet of banks.  The 100 percent reserve or narrow banking system 
proposes to further regulate the asset side of the balance sheet.
6   The arguments in favor 
of a 100 percent reserve system, or the narrowest of narrow banking, go beyond the 
Friedman-Simons goal of stabilizing the growth rate of the money stock.  To begin with it 11 
 
is difficult to understand in the first place why it is optimal for 53 percent of transactions 
balances  (the currency proportion of M1 on June 1, 2009) to be defined as legal tender 
by the government and therefore riskless while 46 percent (the demand deposit 
proportion) is subject to some risk.  Ever since the Great Depression of the 1930’s the 
transaction mechanism underlying our money economy has relied on the banks’ pledge to 
convert the par value of checking account money into currency money on demand, and to 
transfer on demand and at par the deposits of agents in one bank to agents at another 
bank.  When banks can’t honor that pledge then to maintain the integrity of the payments 
system a government insurance agency like FDIC steps in to partially or wholly honor the 
pledge.  In order to minimize insurance payouts to depositors of bankrupt banks, the 
FDIC and other regulators monitor the balance sheets of banks.  This monitoring is 
difficult and costly since many of the investments on the banks’ balance sheets are 
opaque.   If public policy requires that both checking account money and currency money 
be transferable and convertible on demand for purposes of carrying out transactions, why 
allow banks to make risky and opaque investments and then go through the costly process 
of monitoring those investments and insuring the deposits that finance them in order to 
facilitate an orderly transaction mechanism?    
      Perhaps the best cost reduction solution in the narrow bank proposal would be for the 
government to supply checking account money through an agency like the Central Bank 
or post office.  There are historical precedents for both although post office banks have 
been more popular.  Checks (or debit entries) on the Central Bank or post office along 
with currency would then become legal tender in the discharge of debts.    From a 
facilities location point of view would it be possible to implement these two government-12 
 
based narrow banks?  In terms of numbers there were 7,842 banks (and falling) in 2003 
with approximately 68,000 branches (and rising) in the U.S. ; and  private estimates put 
the number of post offices at 187,000.
7   It would appear that the number of separate post 
offices would be more than adequate to replace existing banks and their branches with 
post office-based narrow banks.  For a Central Bank based narrow bank the transition 
would be more difficult.  They could buy some of the branches of conventional banks as 
some of them would become redundant under the new system.  Alternatively they could 
rent space for retail kiosks in existing post offices or any retail store for that matter.  In 
both schemes there would be a need to redesign existing facilities and build new ones to 
better match the location of retail banking customers.  There are a number of advantages 
of a government-based narrow banking system.  One advantage is simplicity.  All that 
would have to be done is to provide the necessary facilities and architecture to carry out 
narrow banking, and with advanced planning the elimination of deposit insurance on 
present day bank deposits.  A second advantage of a government-based narrow banking 
system at the retail level is that checking account money would become national money 
like currency rather than local money as bank checks for the most part currently are.   A 
third advantage is that it would be more difficult to undo than a narrow-based system 
comprised of private banks.  Private banks in the past have been successful in undoing 
government regulation and there is every reason to believe that whatever new regulation 
that occurs in response to the current crisis will eventually be undone in less turbulent 
times.  What would happen to existing banks?
8  They would become non-bank financial 
intermediaries of their own choosing and their shares or claims to assets would not be 
insured, at least by the government.  It might be argued in opposition to this solution that 13 
 
a government-based narrow banking system would be slow to introduce new 
technologies that reduce the cost of producing checking account services.  Therefore one 
reason for having private but narrow banks supply checking account money is 
presumably because of the profit incentive to innovate.
9      
     While a government-based narrow banking system would be the first best solution in 
designing a program for financial stability, most of the past proposals for narrow banking 
assume they would be carried out within the framework of private banks.  What 
advantages would accrue to a private or public based narrow banking system?  To begin 
with under a system of narrow banking there would be no need for government regulation 
or deposit insurance except to protect depositors from fraud and other forms of 
malfeasance.  Reserve balances, vault cash, or even T-Bills need little monitoring and the 
monitoring that would be required would be relatively low cost compared to the cost 
incurred in our present system.  Costly supervision and monitoring of banks would 
therefore be greatly reduced.  It would also be the case that narrow banks would not need 
risk-based capital requirements as is now required under the Basle Accord.  Since banks 
would only hold risk-free assets the equity or tier 1 capital required would be 4-5 percent 
of total assets under present requirements.    
     A second argument for separating the deposit supplying function from the financial 
intermediation function of banks has to do with attaining the standard goals of monetary 
policy. An unexpected banking crisis under the current banking system may redirect the 
monetary policy of the Central Bank towards resolving the banking crisis and away from 
achieving a pre-existing goal such as price stability and in the process make that goal 
even more difficult to achieve.  The problem is that governments have only two 14 
 
instruments (monetary and fiscal policy) to achieve three targets; financial stability, 
employment/output stability, and price level stability.    That would seem to be the 
dilemma Central Banks find themselves in 2009.   The 230 percent growth in the balance 
sheet of the Federal Reserve as a result of addressing the financial crisis carries with it the 
danger of increased future inflation.  The bond market recognizes this danger and in mid-
2009 the yield on 10 year T-Bonds rose to 3.72 percent compared to 2.42 percent at the 
end of 2008.  Accordingly regulation should be the means to achieve financial stability.     
     A third advantage of narrow banking would be to price checking account services 
more efficiently.  The provision of these services would become a more important source 
of revenue for narrow banks and they would price them more closely to costs.  Presently 
the cost of checking account services is concealed to the deposit customers of banks by 
the interest rate spread between lending and investing rates of interest and the rates paid 
on deposits.  As a result the deposit customer has little knowledge of the true cost of 
holding checking account money.  Consequently depositors may be consuming too much 
or too little of checking account services. 
     The most important benefit of narrow banking would be a more efficient allocation of 
real investment in the economy.   A Pareto efficient allocation of real investment is one 
where the marginal rate of substitution of return for risk in the preference functions of 
savers equals the marginal rate of transformation of return for risk in the technology of 
investing firms.  This is not the case in our current financial system with deposit 
insurance for banks.  Banks obtain most (roughly 65 percent) of their investible funds 
from depositors.  Because deposits (both checkable and non-checkable) are deemed to be 
important in the functioning of the real economy, deposits are insured by the government.  15 
 
For that reason households and most firms who hold bank deposits view those deposits as 
risk-free and need not worry about or attempt to monitor the opaque investments made by 
their bank that in turn finance the risky real assets in the economy.  This creates a well-
known moral hazard problem where the bank is induced to overinvest in risky financial 
assets like loans and securities with high expected returns but also high risk.  The end 
result is that the risks of the bank’s assets are greater than the perceived (by depositors) 
risk of its deposit liabilities and equity.  It also means that the risks generated on the real 
assets in the economy are greater than the perceived risks on the ultimate financial claims 
(i.e., insured deposits and non-insured claims) of savers against those assets.  One easy 
way to see this is to assume the opportunity locus of real investments in the market 
portfolio of risky firms in the economy is concave in mean return and standard deviation 
of returns space like the efficient set in the CAPM, and that indifference curves of savers 
are convex in return-risk space.  Savers would choose a point (an allocation of savings to 
the various risky assets in the market portfolio) on the concave mean-standard deviation 
efficient productive opportunity curve where the slope of their indifference curve --i.e., 
the marginal rate of substitution of expected return for risk-- equals the slope of the 
productive opportunity locus—i.e., the marginal rate of transformation between expected 
return and risk.
10  When they turn a portion of their wealth over to banks the less risk 
averse managers of banks then choose a different allocation further up the productive 
opportunity locus with both higher (but diminishing) mean return and higher (and 
increasing) standard deviation of return or risk.  At that point the marginal rate of 
transformation of return for risk on the market portfolio (an allocation of real capital to 
risky firms) is less than the marginal rate of substitution of return for risk in the 16 
 
indifference curve of savers who invested a portion of their savings in insured banks.   
The end result is that more of the savings of depositors is invested in the risky sector and 
less in the risk-free sector than the depositors would have chosen had they made the 
investments directly themselves.  This additional risk on the real assets in the economy 
does not disappear.  The absorber of that risk differential are tax payers in the form of  
the deposit insuring agency or the Central bank when they pay off depositors of failed 
banks or share future losses when arranging mergers between troubled banks and healthy 
banks.  To moderate this risk shifting that occurs on the asset side of the balance sheet of 
banks, government regulators have focused their attention on the liability and equity side 
of the balance sheet.  Various Basle Accords on risk-based capital requirements have 
tried to mitigate this moral hazard problem by requiring banks to adjust the amount of 
their equity finance in response to changes in the risk of their portfolio strategy.  
However the opacity of the investments in their portfolio--partly the result of modern 
financial engineering—makes this almost an impossible task.  The crisis of 2007-2009 
suggests that the Basle risk-based capital requirements were too low.  In any event under 
the present regulatory framework risky assets are subsidized in the sense that the return 
required per unit of risk by depositors who ultimately finance them is lower than it would 
be in the absence of deposit insurance.  The chief beneficiaries of this risk subsidy 
recently have been households and risky business firms.  Their cost of capital has been 
lower and their real investment higher than would have been the case in the absence of 
subsidized deposit insurance.  Who loses from this subsidy to risk-taking?  The 
government in that they have to pay a higher rate of interest on their risk-free debt, and 17 
 
then every so often they must pay out on their insurance claim and debt guarantees to the 
banking sector.   
     There are benefits and costs in the real economy associated with this subsidy for risk-
taking.  On the benefit side more savings are allocated to risky investments, the kind of 
investments that in developing countries with stable legal and political environments can 
result in higher average rates of economic growth.  New firms with innovative products 
have a better chance of coming to the economic surface when the financial system is 
tilted towards the financing of risky projects with high expected returns but also high 
risk.  However the benefit of a higher rate of investment led economic growth in the 
expansion phase of the business cycle comes at the cost of a greater decline in real output 
growth in the ensuing recession as we are now experiencing in 2008-2009.  The 
amplification of expansions and recessions partly caused by bank lending is a natural part 
of the economic landscape when the financial system is oriented towards the financing of 
risky real investments.  One disadvantage of deposit insurance as a subsidy to risky real 
investments is that the amount of it depends on the risk perceptions and risk aversion of 
bank shareholders and the resulting portfolio decisions of bank managers.  The risk 
perceptions and aversion of investors change over time.  This is the problem the Federal 
Reserve and other Central Banks are confronting in 2008-2009 in their attempt to get 
banks lending again.  Bad shocks that increase the risk perceptions and risk aversion of 
bank shareholders and thereby reduce the valuation of bank shares, are the market signal 
for banks to reduce their investments in risky loans and securities and switch to safe 
securities.  Good external shocks that reduce the risk perceptions and risk aversion of 
bank shareholders and raise the market value of bank shares, are the market signal for 18 
 
bank managers to increase their investment in risky loans and risky securities and reduce 
their investments in safe securities.  It is this volatility of bank lending and the real 
investment it finances that contributes to the amplification of the business cycle under the 
present fractional reserve private banking system with deposit insurance.  Perhaps other 
forms of growth subsidies through the tax system that are less subject to volatile changes 
in risk perceptions and risk aversion of investors would be a more appropriate way to 
subsidize risky investment and growth. 
     Narrow banking has never had many advocates among academic economists.  One 
reason for this is that its proponents have evidently not made a convincing economic 
argument that deposit-taking and risky lending—beside the fact they are separate 
activities—should be carried out by two or more types of financial institutions.  One of 
the strengths of the advocates for the present system is that they have put forth at least 
one economic argument for combining the functions of deposit-taking and lending.  One 
such argument is provided by Kashyap, Rajan, and Stein (2002).  These authors begin by 
observing that deposit-taking and lending in the form of loan commitments (or overdraft 
privileges) both represent a demand for liquidity by individuals and firms in the 
economy.  Both of these demands for liquidity require the providing institution to hold a 
stock of liquid assets themselves that in turn service these demands.  From these two 
observations Kashyap, Rajan, and Stein then argue that if these two demands for liquidity 
are not perfectly correlated, it makes economic sense to combine deposit-taking and 
lending in the same type of financial institution, namely banks.  The reason is that a 
smaller quantity of liquid assets can service both demands for liquidity when they are 
provided by a single entity compared to the case when they are provided by two or more 19 
 
entities.  Liquid assets (eg., cash, reserve accounts with the Central bank, short-term 
riskless assets, etc.) in their model represent “costly overhead” that are required to service 
the demands for liquidity by depositors and lending commitments to borrowers.  They 
argue this overhead is costly because: i) cash and until recently reserves yield a zero 
nominal return; ii) short-term riskless securities yield a nominal return but this return is 
subject to double taxation since currently banks are required to use the corporate form of 
business organization; and iii) borrowing from the corporate finance literature they argue 
that large stocks of liquid assets increases agency costs of the banks.  For these reasons it 
is desirable that this costly overhead be reduced to a minimum which it will be if deposit-
taking and lending are carried out by a bank and the two demands for liquidity they 
service are not perfectly correlated.  In other words, present day banks are low cost 
producers of liquidity services precisely because they service both demands.  Were 
narrow banks mandated into existence the volume of loans per unit of “costly overhead” 
would be reduced with a loss in economic performance. 
     Their argument that a given stock of liquid assets can support a larger volume of 
lending when deposit-taking and lending are combined into a single entity is interesting.  
But does more loan finance for more real investment in the economy per unit of liquid 
assets always result in a social optimum?  If that higher real investment is subsidized in 
some way, say through deposit insurance, the answer would be: No.  Even more relevant 
is the question of whether the lending of the banks in their model is subject to credit risk.   
Their assumption (Kashyap et al., 2002, p.40) that loans made at date 0 and paid off at 
date 2 suggests that their loans are riskless and the only risks in the system are 
unexpected demands for liquidity from deposit withdrawals and real investment 20 
 
opportunities giving rise to loan commitments.  Will their argument hold if the loans of 
their deposit-taking and lending banks are risky?  If this is the case and absent deposit 
insurance, the deposit-taking and lending bank would be subject to a third demand for 
liquidity; namely, the demand for liquidity from depositors when they learn that the loans 
of their bank have suffered a reduction in value.  On the other hand if the deposits are 
insured by government the end result is that this third demand for liquidity does not 
materialize and society ends up with a larger and riskier stock of real capital than it would 
have if deposit-taking and lending were separated as in the narrow banking proposal.  
Firms are generating less return per unit of risk than private savers require given their 
marginal rate of substitution between return and risk.  Our conclusion is that the amount 
of real investment that produces an equality of the marginal rate of substitution of return 
for risk of savers with the marginal rate of transformation of return for risk of firms is a 
better indicator of social welfare than minimizing the costly overhead of holding the 
pieces of paper representing liquid assets.               
     How might a transition from our present banking system to a narrow banking system 
be implemented?  The first thing to note is that our version of the narrow banking 
proposal, unlike Friedman’s, only applies to transaction or checkable deposits rather than 
all the deposits that are currently protected by FDIC insurance. Balance sheet data for all 
commercial banks indicates that in May 2009 cash and reserve accounts at the Federal 
Reserve alone were equal to 114 percent of checkable deposits.  It would appear that the 
banking system would not have to undergo a particularly difficult portfolio adjustment to 
achieve the portfolio required of narrow banks.  The difficulty for existing banks would 
be spinning-off their risky loans and investments business along with their non-checkable 21 
 
deposits and other liabilities into separate non-bank financial institutions.    It would be 
these non-bank financial institutions that would make business and consumer loans 
(including credit card loans) and invest in risky securities.
11  The financing of these assets 
would be provided by various non-checkable claims.  There are reasons to think the time 
period of the adjustment from the present day banking firm to narrow banks and non-
bank financial intermediaries would not be overly long.  One reason is that in the past it 
did not take banks very long to get into new financial services businesses once bank 
regulations were eased.  Moreover the downsizing through spin-offs of existing banks 
(eg., Citigroup), non-bank financial enterprises (eg., Lehmann Bros.), and even non-
financial firms  (eg., GM and Chrysler) in the crisis of 2007-2009 appears not to be 
taking an inordinate length of time.  Alternatively the risky loans and investments during 
the transition period could just be sold to investors like private equity groups and if 
economically viable later repackaged into publicly owned non-bank financial enterprises.  
The determinants of how long it would take the present banking system to evolve into 
narrow banks and non-bank financial intermediaries would depend on the volume of 
reserves held by banks, when the government would remove deposit insurance, and when 
banks would start charging for checking account services.  For new narrow banks there 
would be no problem of adjusting from a risky portfolio of assets to a riskless portfolio.   
     What about individuals and firms that hold non-checkable deposits that are currently 
insured by FDIC?  One reason deposit insurance was extended to these agents is that the 
government evidently felt obliged to provide a nominally risk-free interest bearing asset 
mainly for individuals and small firms that wanted a safe haven for their savings.  If this 
is thought politically necessary the Treasury could provide non-marketable savings bonds 22 
 
in different denominations and maturities and terms that would parallel the maturities and 
terms of existing non-checkable deposits.  These savings bonds could be sold at post 
offices, narrow banks, other financial institutions, and online directly from the Treasury. 
     Finally, how would the proposed narrow banks generate income in order to attract 
capital?  One source of income would be interest earned on their deposit balances at the 
Federal Reserve.  If narrow banks were allowed to hold risk-free short-term treasury 
securities, then the interest on these treasury securities would be another source of 
revenues.  Still another source of revenue would be fees they would charge their checking 
account customers.  To insure that checkable deposit customers would not be exploited in 
the form of high fees, there would be free entry into the narrow banking business subject 
only to the owners and manager being of good moral character.  In this scheme non-
financial firms could own narrow banks.  Lastly narrow banks could earn an assortment 
of fees for providing various non-banking services for customers as they do now such as 
accounting and record keeping for small businesses, pension and trust services, providing 
safety deposit services and the like.              
     Of course moving to a narrow banking system would not completely eliminate the 
financial amplification of the business cycle.  Non-bank financial institutions as well as 
individual investors operating in speculative securities markets are subject to the same 
swings in risk perceptions and investor sentiment in response to external shocks as banks.  
How might the swings in risk perceptions and risk aversion in non-bank financial 
institutions and financial markets be moderated in order to reduce the amplification of the 
business cycle caused by the financial system?  For non-bank financial institutions such 
as finance companies, investment banks, and any other financial institution whose 23 
 
financing involves significant counterparty risk, we propose that simple Basle I type 
capital requirements should be imposed on the non-banks for the same reason they were 
imposed on banks.  The same would apply to various types of insurance companies.  The 
objective of those requirements would be to balance portfolio risk with financing risk.  
The riskier the assets contained in the portfolios of non-bank financial institutions, the 
more equity capital (or less leverage) should be required to finance the portfolio.  There 
are two administrative ways to achieve this variation in financial leverage.  One way 
discussed below is to re-impose selective credit controls such as margin requirements at 
the discretion of the Central Bank.   The other administrative way is through a Basle-like 
risk-based capital requirement.  What exactly the Basle-like risk-based capital 
requirements for different non-bank financial institutions should be in order to reduce 
contagion risk in the financial system must be the subject of future research.  One 
possibility is to simplify the requirements by having only two asset categories: i) riskless 
assets requiring a relatively low equity leverage ratio on total assets; and ii) risky assets 
requiring a much higher equity leverage ratio.  In light of the 2007-2009 crisis it would 
appear that a 4-5 percent equity leverage ratio or tier1 requirement on risk-based assets 
and an 8-10 percent tier 1 plus tier 2 requirement are wholly inadequate. 
                 Policies for Stabilizing Speculative Asset Prices 
     Financial assets traded in markets are another source of financial instability that can 
spill over to the real economy and amplify business cycles.  Volatility in stock valuations 
induces volatility in real corporate investment, consumption and GDP as the evidence of  
Barro (1990), Panageas (2003),  Baker et al. (2003), Kau et al. (2004), Polk and Sapienza 
(2004), Gilchrist et al. (2005), and Chirinko and Schaller (2007), among others indicates.   24 
 
Some of this volatility in financial asset markets is the result of financing speculative 
asset portfolios with debt.    To the extent this is the case one proposal to partially 
moderate this volatility is for the government to cyclically vary the tax deductibility of 
interest payments for all investors (except non-financial firms) transacting in speculative 
asset markets.  A second way to dampen volatility in certain asset markets is for the 
Federal Reserve to use its selective controls over margin requirements and minimum 
down payments for the stock markets and real estate markets in a pro-active way.  The 
general idea would be to raise margin requirements and down payments when these 
markets are deemed “exuberantly” high, and reduce them when they are low.  To this list 
of assets we would add certain commodities whose prices are subject to speculative 
bubbles.  The margin requirements for all speculative asset transactions should apply to 
all individual investors and non-bank financial enterprises that are allowed to borrow 
such as investment banks, hedge funds, closed-end mutual funds, and private equity 
funds.  These selective controls could substitute for or compliment the Basle Accord on 
risk-based capital.  Moreover during a downturn in these markets this could be reinforced 
by keeping the prohibition against “naked” short-selling (selling an asset without first 
borrowing it), and reinstating the “uptick” rule for short sales.
12   Before 2007-2009 these 
proposals were unthinkable and ones not advocated by the regulatory authorities who 
have jurisdiction over these rules.  However, some of them have emerged as policy albeit 
for a short time period in the crisis.  When the short selling ban on financials in 
September 2008 was in effect, it blunted the collapse in share prices of various financial 
institutions (Harris et al., 2009, and Gagnon and Witmer, 2009).    It is sometimes argued 
that investors got around these rules when put options were available on stocks where 25 
 
short selling was banned.  Even if that were the case it would seem that it would be a 
more expensive way to circumvent a ban on short selling still making the ban somewhat 
effective.  Just as wars allow the medical profession to experiment, the crisis of 2007-
2009 allowed the Federal Reserve and the regulatory authorities to experiment.  If the 
emergency rules were helpful in saving the financial system when it was in crisis, it 
would seem they could be helpful in preventing a financial crisis in the first place.   
     A second way to moderate fluctuations in the prices of speculative assets like common 
stocks is for the Federal Reserve to carry out stabilizing open market operations in an 
index of the market portfolio (where the unsystematic risk of the portfolio is reduced to 
some minimum) of equity shares.  Similar proposals have been made by Fischer and 
Merton (1984, pp. 93-94), and Krainer (2003, pp.285-288) among others.  The form this 
investment in the market portfolio might take would be purchases and sales of index 
mutual funds like the Vanguard 500.  Alternatively they could form a broader index 
mutual fund themselves. One way to implement this stabilizing strategy would be to 
establish a long-run trend for share prices based on the long-run permanent earnings of 
the business sector.  Around this trend the Federal Reserve could establish an α-percent 
(eg., 5%, 10%, …) filter band that would depend in some way on the magnitude of 
transitory earnings of the business sector.  If the index of the market portfolio fell below 
(or above) the lower (or upper) α-percent band, the Federal Reserve would buy (or sell) 
the mutual fund holding the index of the market portfolio until it reached the lower (or 
upper) band.  Again, before 2007 the suggestion that the Central Bank should buy and 
sell an index fund of risky assets like equities would be viewed by most economists as 
irresponsible.  Since 2007 this suggestion in retrospect seems to be somewhat bland and 26 
 
perhaps overly conservative because Central Banks like the Federal Reserve have already 
purchased billions of dollars of risky assets.  These purchases were not in the form of a 
diversified efficient market portfolio designed to minimize unsystematic risk and stabilize 
the market as a whole as suggested above, but instead they were the securities of 
individual firms in grave financial difficulties.   The financial maelstrom beginning in 
2007 put Central Banks and Fiscal Authorities on a war-like footing.  The conventional 
views on moral hazard for conventional times, and the scope of the roles of Central 
Banks and Fiscal Authorities in free enterprise economies were thrown to the wind.  Only 
in the case of the investment bank Lehman Brothers did the Federal Reserve and 
Treasury bring up the well-known arguments of moral hazard when denying that firm the 
financial accommodation granted to other financial institutions; and in retrospect that 
denial was viewed as a policy mistake due to the counterparty risk it unleashed.  How 
were these subventions in various enterprises received by the stock market?  Did the 
market collapse when financial institutions were rescued in various ways because of 
concerns about moral hazard problems and the long-run viability of capitalism?  When 
the U.S. House of Representatives defeated the $700 billion financial rescue plan in late 
September 2008, the Dow Jones Industrial Average fell 777.68 points, the largest one day 
drop in stock prices in history (WSJ.com, September 30, 2008).  Soon after this strong 
statement by the stock market the rescue plan was passed by the House.  It would appear 
that at that time the market was not opposed to taking on more moral hazard risk in the 
form of bailouts even if they threatened the core values of capitalism.   
     What advantages might be expected from Central Banks carrying out open market 
operations in a portfolio of equities in the way described above?   After all if markets 27 
 
were perfectly efficient, purchases and sales of short-term riskless assets like T-Bills 
would quickly be arbitraged out to the corporate bond and stock markets without the 
Central Bank having to deal directly in those markets.  It would therefore seem that one 
of the implicit assumptions underlying this proposal is that financial markets are not 
perfectly efficient.  The particular form of market imperfection underlying this proposal 
is that market prices often overshoot their intrinsic valuations.  According to DeLong 
et.al (1990) and Schleifer (1996) these departures of market prices from intrinsic 
valuations cannot be easily arbitraged away by rational and sophisticated traders because 
of their own risk aversion, their limited access to financial capital, and the fact that these 
sophisticated traders are monitored by less sophisticated principals who determine their 
remuneration.  Accordingly the Central Bank is in a position to overcome these 
imperfections and move market prices closer to their efficient intrinsic valuations not to 
mention the profit that would accompany this strategy.  The Federal Reserve in principle 
should have low risk aversion and, as we have recently seen, access to large amounts of 
financial capital.  While they are monitored by less sophisticated but powerful principals 
like the President and the Congress, they are protected by an Act of Congress, fixed term 
appointments, and powerful friends in the financial system.  It would therefore seem that 
while this policy could possibly increase volatility within the +/- α percent filter bands if 
traders learned these bands, it would eliminate “excessive” fluctuations in the general 
level of stock prices outside the filter bands.   And by eliminating excessive fluctuations 
in the stock market they would move towards smoothing out fluctuations in real 
investment and economic activity.   28 
 
     How might this work in practice?  For example suppose there is a negative shock that 
occurs when rating agencies grossly mis-judge for the first time the quality of complex 
and opaque financial products.  This negative information shock could be expected to 
raise the risk perceptions and risk aversion of investors both of which raise their required 
rate of return and drive down the price of risky securities below the lower α-percent filter 
band established by the Central Bank.  As private investors with high and rising risk 
aversion are fleeing to safety by getting out of the market, the Central Bank with low risk 
aversion is getting into the market thereby cushioning the fall in the market valuations of 
risky securities like equities.  In the end the cost of equity capital does not rise as much as 
it would have absent the intervention by the Central Bank and risky real investment and 
economic activity does not fall as much as it would have absent the intervention.  The 
reverse would occur in the wake of a good shock as irrational exuberance takes hold 
driving stock prices towards the α-percent upper band set by the Central Bank.  With this 
open market strategy the Central Bank could go a long way in achieving its goal of 
stabilizing securities markets that are periodically overshooting and undershooting their 
intrinsic value and reducing the amplification of the business cycle caused by changing 
risk perceptions and risk aversion of investors in the financial system.   
     What problems and criticisms might this proposal for open market operations in risky 
equities have to confront?  One criticism is that it might result in government ownership 
of various firms much like what is happening in mid-2009.   Most economists, non-
economists, and the government itself are uncomfortable with the prospect of government 
taking an ownership position in the automobile, banking, and insurance businesses.  This 
criticism would not apply to the above proposal.  The proposal is for the government in 29 
 
the form of the Central Bank to buy and sell index mutual funds that in turn would buy 
and sell the individual equities comprising the index.  The index mutual funds would vote 
the individual stocks on matters of concern to the shareholders much as they do now.  
     A second criticism might be that large Central Bank inflows and outflows of funds to 
these index mutual funds in order to keep stock market averages within some α-percent 
filter band might discourage some “smart money” from trading in the market.  This in 
turn would leave more trading in the hands of so-called “noise” or uninformed traders to 
establish relative prices.  If this would occur the relative prices of equities that would 
emerge might not reflect all the relevant information pertaining to their intrinsic 
valuations.  The end result is that real investment might be inefficiently allocated across 
the different sectors in the economy.  A related criticism would be that to the extent the 
index that mutual funds would be investing in fell short of some true market portfolio 
containing all the traded securities of firms in the economy, there could result a 
misallocation of real investment between the firms in the index and those firms outside 
the index.  The end result would be that the volatility of security prices, real investment, 
and output of firms outside the index would increase relative to the real investment and 
output of firms inside the index.  Of course to the extent sophisticated traders remained in 
the market they would arbitrage away any differences between the share prices of firms 
within and outside the index purely resulting from Central Bank injections and 
withdrawals of funds into the aggregate securities market.  The important question is 
what effect this policy change will have on the amount of “smart” money in the equity 
markets.  If smart money enters markets where there are arbitrage opportunities, then 
pricing discrepancies between firms inside and outside the index should provide the 30 
 
necessary incentives.  These are of course empirical questions that await empirical 
answers from future research. 
     Finally in the end this policy recommendation would seemingly put more power in the 
hands of the Central Bank and perhaps Treasury to stabilize the economy.  It is one thing 
to have the Central Bank carry out open market operations in “T-Bills mostly” and have 
the effect spread to the corporate bond and stock markets by many private traders, and it 
is quite something else to have them deal directly in these markets.  They would be under 
considerable political pressure not to stop a stock market boom fueled by irrational 
exuberance, itself a concept that is hard to define objectively.  On the other hand, equally 
important if not more difficult decisions are taken routinely by the Supreme Court and 
other branches of government using their subjective judgment and interpretation of the 
law in some current situation.  Why can’t it be so with the Central Bank?     
 
        III. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
     The 2007-2009 financial and economic crisis has been a remarkable event.  The fact 
that financial economists (who helped create the advanced and complicated financial 
architecture that some blame for facilitating the crisis) along with stabilizing and 
regulatory government organizations such as the Federal Reserve and the Treasury 
Department for the most part did not see it coming is remarkable.  The fact that many of 
these same financial economists and government organizations are now offering solutions 
to this and future crises is also remarkable.
13  Not being deterred by this incongruity we 
have in this paper outlined several suggestions for reforming the financial system in 31 
 
advanced economies with developed financial markets.  These suggestions for reform are 
not particularly new although they have not surfaced in recent discussions on regulatory 
policy.  The main suggestions were to: i) move towards a narrow banking system
14,  ii) 
reinstate selective credit controls over purchases of real estate, certain commodities, and 
corporate securities for all financial investors, and iii) have the Central Bank carry out 
open market operations in a market portfolio of risky stocks with the view of stabilizing 
fluctuations in the price level of these securities.  These suggestions are based on the 
theoretically and empirically documented premise that some markets for speculative 
assets and the present day banking system amplify cyclical fluctuations in real economic 
activity and employment.  The 2007-2009 crisis is just the latest and most severe in a 
series of finance driven crises since World War II.  Our financial system driven by 
sudden shock-induced fluctuations in risk perceptions and risk aversion is proving to be 
an expensive externality for the real economy, and externalities are one justification for 
government intervention and regulation.  Unemployment rates reaching 10 percent are a 
very high price to pay to allow financial innovation to out-pace financial regulation.  The 
objective of our proposals is to moderate the amplifying effect of the financial system on 
the real economy.  This means dampen expansions as well as recessions.  The ultimate 
question is whether citizens are prepared to pay the price of the former to achieve the 
goal of the latter.  If not the demand and supply of present day bailouts will continue 
unabated and our economic system will come closer to one of privatizing gains in good 
states of nature but socializing losses in bad states.  Ultimately this will undermine the 
philosophical and ethical foundations of a free enterprise system. 
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    ENDNOTES 
 
 
1.  Earlier advocates of the 100 percent reserve requirement were Henry Simons 
(1934) and Irving Fisher (1935).  In Friedman’s version the 100 percent 
reserve requirement would apply to all deposits; checking accounts, retail 
money market mutual fund accounts at banks, savings deposits, and small 
time deposits 
 
    
2.  The balance sheet data for the Federal Reserve Bank was obtained from a 
speech given by the Chair Ben Bernanke at the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Richmond 2009 Credit Market Symposium on April 3, 2009. 
 
3.   Procyclicality of bank lending has been observed in the banking literature for 
quite some time.   Reasons for this behavior are regulatory factors such as the 
various Basle Accords and various non-regulatory factors.  A partial listing of 
the former would include Bernanke and Lown (1991), Lang and Nakamura 
(1995), Berger and Udell (1994), Hancock and Wilcox (1994), Peek and 
Rosengren (1995), Shrieves and Dahl (1995), Stanton (1998), Wagster (1999), 
Borio et al. (2001), Estrella (2004), Pennacchi (2005), and Catarineu-Rabell et 
al. (2005) among many others.  A partial listing of non-regulatory causes 
would include Bernanke and Gertler ( 1989), Rajan (1994), Bernanke et. al. 
(1996), Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), Berger et al., 2001), Berger and Udell 
(2003), Gorton and He (2005), Krainer (2009), and Abiad et al.(2009). 
 
4.  There is a large literature indicating that the risk premium and Sharpe ratio are 
countercyclical both of which are consistent with time varying risk aversion.  
Theoretical contributions include Campbell and Cochrane (1999), Chan and 
Kogin (2002), and Bekaert et al. (2006).  Ex-post empirical work includes 
Fama and French (1989), Ferson and Harvey (1991), Harrison and Zhang 
(1999), Harvey (2001), and Bekaert et al. (2009) among many others. 
 
Graham and Harvey (2009) provide evidence on the inter-temporal movement 
in the ex-ante equity risk premium over the period 2000Q3-2009Q2.  Over 
this time period they survey on average 300 Chief Financial Officers of U.S. 
firms to get their estimate of the future 10 year expected returns on the S&P 
500 stock index.  From this expected return on equity they subtract the yield 
on 10 year T-bonds.  For the period 2002Q2-2004Q2 the median risk 
premium was 3.73 percent.  For the 10 quarter run-up to the crisis 2004Q3-
2006Q4 the median risk premium fell to 2.66 percent for a reduction of 1.07 
percent.  For the 10 quarter crisis period 2007Q1-2009Q2 the median risk 33 
 
premium rose to 3.63 percent for an increase of .97 percent.  This suggests 
that risk aversion fell in the 10 quarter run-up to the crisis and then rose  
during the crisis period. 
 
5.  The growth in the profitability of the financial sector in the post WW II period 
has been extraordinary.  In 1948 profits in the financial sector were roughly $3 
billion or slightly less that 10 percent of total corporate profits.  The peak was 
reached in 2002 when profits (ex bonuses) in the financial sector were $398 
billion or 45 percent of total corporate profits. What did society get for those 
high profits and large bonuses?  According to the finance and growth 
literature (Levine, 2005) a well-developed and efficient financial system 
facilitates the transfer of financial resources from savers to investing firms 
which presumably stimulates growth enhancing real business investment.  It 
does this by reducing asymmetric information and moral hazard problems 
between savers and investors.  What has actually happened to non-residential 
investment over this 54 year period?  In 1948 non-residential investment was 
$26.8 billion or 10 percent of GDP.  In 2002 non-residential investment was 
$1,066 billion or 10 percent of GDP.  The payoff to a developed country like 
the U.S. from a sophisticated and highly profitable financial system was 
evidently not in a commensurate relative increase in total company investment 
nor as we will see in the productivity of that investment.  Of course the 
equipment and software component of business investment relative to GDP 
did grow from 6.4 percent of GDP in 1948 to 7.4 percent in 2002 (reaching a 
maximum of 8.4 percent in 1979), but that was more the result of a general 
increase in the use of computers and software.  What about growth in the real 
economy as measured by the average percentage rate of growth of real GDP 
and the growth in multifactor productivity?  Splitting the 1960-2008 period in 
half the average growth rate in real GDP for the period 1960-1983 was 3.41 
percent and for the period 1984-2008 it was 3.25.   Finally, was financial 
development associated with increases in multifactor productivity as measured 
by the Bureau of Labor Statistics?  For multifactor productivity the average 
growth rate was 2.45 percent for the period 1960-1983, and for the period 
1984-2008 it was 2.23 percent.  It would appear that the growing profits and 
bonuses in the financial sector were not associated with higher growth rates in 
real output or multifactor productivity. On the other hand it is true that the 
modern financial architecture in the form of securitization of home mortgages 
and credit card debt has moderated the effect on household consumption and 
investment of the growing inequality in real income that has occurred in the 
U.S. for the past 25 years.  The working poor have had increased access to 
credit.  It is ironic that it was the borrowing of this group that brought on the 
sub-prime crisis in 2007 destroying some of the wealth of those more 
fortunate than themselves over the past 25 years. 
 
6.  There is no general agreement on what types of assets banks would be 
allowed to hold under the various narrow bank proposals.  At one end of the 
spectrum the Friedman-Simons plan had banks holding cash and reserve 34 
 
accounts at the Federal Reserve.  Litan (1987) proposes that the assets be 
restricted to U.S. Treasury securities and federally guaranteed securities.  
Pierce (1991) proposes narrow banks should be restricted to short-term 
Treasury securities and highly rated short-term commercial paper.  Krainer 
(2002) would only allow banks to invest in cash, reserves, and short-term T-
Bills.  Finally, Bryan (1991) at the other end of the spectrum would allow 
banks to invest in short-term Treasury securities, high quality short-term 
commercial paper, and loans to small businesses and individuals.  All of these 
proposals are better than the assets banks are currently allowed to buy 
although we now personally favor the original Friedman-Simons plan of 
restricting investments to cash and reserve accounts at the Central Bank.  One 
advantage is that it would leave the maximum amount of Treasury securities 
available for investors to attain their optimal mix of risky and riskless 
investments in their portfolios. 
 
 
7.  For the number of banks and bank branches see Jones and Critchfield (2005) 
and Spieker (2004).  For the private estimate of the number of post offices in 
the U.S. see http://www.postalhistory.com/Post_offices/index.htm 
 
8.  There is a question of what to do about money market mutual funds which 
offer limited checking account services.  We agree with Boyd and 
Jagannathan (2009) that they should be given a choice.  If they continued to 
offer limited checking account services they would be included and subject to 
the same regulations as narrow banks.  If they eliminated their checking 
account services they would be classified as an ordinary mutual fund.    
 
9.  It has been observed in the popular press in the U.K. that private banks have 
been very slow in introducing known technologies that would greatly speed-
up check clearing.  The reason often given is that implementing these 
technologies is less profitable than developing complex financial products.  
See “The Slow Drip of the Faster Payments System,” by John Kay in the 
Financial Times, June 17, 2009, p. 9.  The argument that government 
regulation always produces a chilling effect on innovation seems to be the last 
refuge of a banker to paraphrase Dr. Johnson. 
 
10.  Stiglitz (1972) describes this condition for Pareto efficiency in an economy 
where investment is allocated to different risky firms according to the mean-
variance CAPM.  
 
11.  Are banks better monitors of loans to firms and individuals than non-banks 
such as finance companies, insurance companies, or other non-bank mutual 
funds that would emerge out of a narrow banking system?  To be sure one 
advantage is that present day banks have access to checking account balances 
of loan customers.  However, if this is thought to be important a covenant 
requiring the borrower to provide checking account balances at whatever 35 
 
frequency is thought necessary could easily be inserted in any loan contract 
between the borrower and the lending non-bank financial institution.  The fact 
that finance companies make business and consumer loans in competition 
with present day banks indicates that monitoring disadvantages for non-banks 
would not be much of a problem. For a careful empirical analysis reaching the 
same conclusion for banks and finance companies see Carey et al., 1998. 
 
12. In an interesting experimental setting with “smart” traders and “noise” traders, 
Bhojraj et al. (2009) illustrate that placing more capital in the hands of smart 
traders by relaxing margin requirements will reduce equilibrium overpricing, 
but at the expense of attenuating observed overpricing by slowing the 
convergence to equilibrium.  This is because any given smart arbitrager 
cannot predict the trading strategies of other smart arbitragers thus giving rise 
to the phenomena of synchronization risk.  The delay in convergence to 
equilibrium prices occurs because it is more profitable to first “front-run” the 
noise traders and then delay the equilibrating arbitrage trades relative to other 
smart traders.  Early short-selling arbitragers run the risk of a margin call 
before prices reach their lower equilibrium level.  One unintended 
consequence of a ban on short selling is that it transfers wealth from buyers to 
sellers.  For an analysis of this effect see (Harris et al., 2009).    
 
13. There has developed in the past several years a huge literature dealing with 
various causes of the current crisis along with suggestions for reforming the 
U.S. financial system in hopes of preventing future crises.  Some (but far from 
all) suggestions have found their way into the 88 page Treasury document 
“FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM, A NEW FOUNDATION: 
REBUILDING FINANCIAL SUPERVISION AND REGULATION,” 
Department of the Treasury, June 2009.  The recommendations in this 
document are organized around the following five principles: i) Promote 
robust supervision and regulation of financial firms; ii) Establish 
comprehensive regulation of financial markets; iii) Protect consumers and 
investors from financial abuse; iv) Provide government with the tools it needs 
to manage financial crises; and v) Raise international regulatory standards and 
improve international cooperation. This report at present (August 2009) is 
somewhat short on details and is primarily devoted to identifying where the 
financial system failed in the run-up to the crisis, and how best to resolve a 
crisis once it has started.  One proposal that is specific enough to be criticized 
is the so-called Systemic Risk Authority that would give the Federal Reserve 
the authority to regulate any and all financial institutions that pose a threat to 
systemic risk. What exact form that regulatory authority will take is not 
known at this point.  It would appear (in the summer of 2009) that Congress 
will be reluctant to grant such broad regulatory powers without subjecting the 
Federal Reserve itself to a greater degree of Congressional oversight. 
 
14.  It will be argued that removal of the explicit government safety net on 
depository institutions will just push the implicit safety net further on to 36 
 
whatever group of financial institution gets into trouble in the next financial 
crisis.  The orchestrated workout of Long-Term Capital Management by the 
Federal Reserve in 1998, the rescue of various types of nonbank financial 
institutions and even non-financial enterprises in the recent crisis will be 
argued to be evidence supporting this view.  This need not be so.  Government 
in this current crisis did not save the hedge funds, private equity funds, or 
sovereign wealth funds that provided equity financing to the banking sector 
during the early stages of the crisis only to see those equity valuations 
evaporate in the later stages of the crisis. Nor did the government save the 
many types of mutual funds and pension funds investing in equity securities 
when equity prices collapsed in 2008 erasing trillions of dollars of investor 
wealth.   Why should mutual funds investing in private risky equity type 
securities be treated differently than mutual funds investing in private risky 
debt securities?         
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